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The conventional wisdom regarding party system fragmentation assumes that the effects of 
electoral systems and social cleavages are linear. However, recent work applying 
organizational ecology theories to the study of party systems has challenged the degree to 
which electoral system effects are linear. This paper applies such concepts to the study of 
social cleavages. Drawing from theories of organizational ecology and the experience of 
many ethnically diverse African party systems, I argue that the effects of ethnic diversity are 
nonlinear, with party system fragmentation increasing until reaching moderate levels of 
diversity before declining as diversity reaches extreme values. Examining this argument 
cross-nationally, the results show that accounting for nonlinearity in ethnic diversity effects 






The conventional wisdom regarding party systems maintains that the number of 
parties is determined by the interaction of electoral systems and social cleavages (Duverger, 
1954; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Clark and Golder, 
2006; Singer and Stephenson, 2009).  According to this literature, more proportional electoral 
systems produce greater party system fragmentation when cleavage diversity increases.  
Implied, though rarely stated so explicitly, is the notion that increases in party system 
fragmentation resulting from increased cleavage diversity are relatively linear.   
Recent work has questioned the degree to which this interaction effect is linear.  
Noting that most work has employed the logged functional form of district magnitude—
which implies a nonlinear relationship to party system fragmentation—instead of the linear 
functional form, Lowery et al. (2010) argue that the relationship between electoral system 
proportionality and party system fragmentation is nonlinear.  Drawing from organizational 
ecology theories, they maintain that at higher levels of proportionality, competition for voters 
becomes too intense and the availability of resources too scarce to support additional political 
parties; thus, increases in party system fragmentation level off at the highest levels of 
electoral system proportionality.   
This paper builds on these criticisms of the linear assumptions made by previous 
research, though focusing specifically on the effect of ethnic diversity.  I examine ethnicity in 
large part because ethnic diversity has been the cleavage measure of choice in most studies 
examining the interaction of electoral systems and social cleavages.  Drawing from 
organizational ecology theories, I argue that the effect of ethnic cleavages is nonlinear.  
While increases in ethnic diversity will produce increases in party system fragmentation at 
moderate levels of ethnic diversity, extreme ethnic diversity will be associated with lower 
levels of party system fragmentation than a linear relationship would imply.  This is because 
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extreme ethnic diversity leaves few ethnic groups with bases of support sizable enough to 
sustain parties with enough votes to compete for control of the government and/or to 
influence policy favorable to their ethnic groups.  Instead, parties in contexts of extreme 
ethnic diversity have to (and often do) build broad multiethnic coalitions if they want to 
compete for control of the government and/or increase their chances of influencing policy.   
In this paper, I examine the linearity of the relationship between ethnic diversity and 
party system fragmentation.  Specifically, I examine whether this organizational ecology 
argument helps to explain the patterns of party system fragmentation cross-nationally.  
Applied to a data set that includes elections from countries around the world, this argument 
helps to explain the nonlinear relationship between ethnic diversity and party system 
fragmentation.   
2. Ethnic Diversity and Party System Fragmentation 
As noted above, most previous research regarding the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and party system fragmentation—which focuses primarily on party systems in 
Western democracies—maintains that the effects of ethnic diversity on party system 
fragmentation are roughly linear (e.g. Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Amorim Neto and 
Cox, 1997; Clark and Golder, 2006).  However, if one is to explain the relationship between 
ethnicity and party systems cross-nationally, one must understand the effects of ethnicity 
within the context of Sub-Saharan African elections and how the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and party system fragmentation seen in African polities fits with the patterns seen 
elsewhere.  Much of the research on African party systems has focused on the degree to 
which the patterns of party system fragmentation in Africa are different—that is, the degree 
to which the effects of institutions and social cleavages on African party systems match the 
findings of previous research.  For instance, some work (Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich, 
2003; though see also Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2007a) has argued that institutions, ethnic 
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cleavages, and the interaction between the two types of variables do not have the same effects 
on party system fragmentation as those seen in previous research focusing on non-African 
party systems.   
The notion that African party systems are distinct is seen particularly clearly with 
regard to the low levels of party system fragmentation and high frequency of one-party 
dominance (Bogaards, 2004).  Contrary to the fears of those like Horowitz (1985), the 
adoption of PR in some African countries has not resulted in highly fragmented party 
systems, as low party system fragmentation pervades the continent, occurring under PR just 
as it does under majoritarian electoral systems (Erdmann and Basedau, 2008).  Some claim 
that low party system fragmentation in African countries occurs in a context of high electoral 
volatility, with one dominant party and several inconsequential opposition parties that enter 
and exit the party system from one election to the next (Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005; though 
see also Bogaards, 2008), while others claim that most African party systems are either 
becoming more institutionalized or have been highly institutionalized from the outset of 
democratic elections (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Lindberg, 2007).  Regardless one’s 
interpretation of the effect and importance of electoral volatility, the consensus remains that 
many African party systems are characterized by low party system fragmentation, despite 
high levels of ethnic diversity in several of those countries.   
Unlike the conventional wisdom, which has assumed that greater ethnic diversity 
produces greater party system fragmentation, some literature focusing on African party 
systems argues that extremely high levels of ethnic diversity actually serve to limit party 
system fragmentation.  As part of the “Big Man” style of politics, African politicians try to 
build the largest possible coalitions of supporters as a means of demonstrating their power 
and prestige, as well as to maintain electoral stability and security (Hyden, 2006: 103-104).  
Given the high degree of ethnic diversity in many African polities, many African politicians 
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often call for national unity in ways that appeal to multiple ethnic groups through what are 
termed ethnic congress parties instead of appealing to voters along specific ethnic-group lines 
as ethnic-based parties do.
1
  As a result, party system fragmentation is low in countries with 
extremely high levels of ethnic diversity (Erdmann and Basedau, 2008).   
A good example of how low levels of party system fragmentation can occur despite 
high levels of ethnic fragmentation is the case of South Africa.  Defined in ethnic terms, 
South Africa’s population is quite diverse: in addition to whites (who can be divided further 
into Dutch Afrikaners and English) and Indians (those whose ancestry traces back to the 
Indian subcontinent), South Africa’s black population is divided into several ethnic groups, 
including (to name a few) the Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Tswana, Sotho, Tsonga, Swazi, Venda, and 
Ndebele.  This fragmentation makes South Africa one of the most ethnically diverse countries 
in the world: using data from Fearon (2003), the effective number of ethnic groups in South 
Africa (i.e. calculating ethnic fragmentation in the same way as party system fragmentation 
using the effective number of parties: see Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) is 8.3.  With such 
considerable ethnic diversity, and basing expectations regarding party system fragmentation 
in South Africa on the conventional wisdom, one would expect that South Africa’s party 
system would be highly fragmented as well.  Despite considerable ethnic diversity and using 
a highly proportional electoral system, party system fragmentation in South Africa is actually 
quite low: the effective number of electoral parties in 1994 and 1999 was 2.24 and 2.16, 
respectively.   
While several prominent opposition parties exist, South Africa’s party system 
revolves predominantly around the African National Congress (ANC), which has won no less 
than 60 percent of the vote since it was first allowed to contest elections in 1994.  Instead of 
party leaders mobilizing voters along ethnic lines, the ANC has chosen to mobilize support 
along racial lines from voters belonging to most of the black African ethnic groups.  This has 
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rendered each South African election into a “racial census,” with political behavior strongly 
influenced by the parties’ racial cues and party support dividing clearly along racial lines 
(Ferree, 2006).  Because black South Africans make up an overwhelming majority of the 
population, this has virtually guaranteed the ANC a dominant position for the foreseeable 
future.   
ANC leaders have chosen to operate as an ethnic congress party in order to prevent 
the proliferation of ethnic-based parties—and the potential ethnic conflict resulting from this 
fragmentation—that would substantially weaken the ANC’s ability to govern, which in turn 
might have threatened the position of black South Africans vis-à-vis whites (Piombo, 2005).  
Despite attempts by some ethnic groups to forge ethnic-based parties—as with the case with 
the Inkatha Freedom Party, which caters primarily to Zulu voters—most black South 
Africans have responded to the ANC’s pan-racial appeals.  (Even Zulu voters appear to be 
heeding such appeals in recent elections: winning more than 10 percent of the vote in 1994, 
the Inkatha Freedom Party was reduced to less than three percent of the vote in the 2014 
election.)  Thus, the case of South Africa illustrates how party leaders in highly diverse 
societies will make broad appeals across ethnic lines in order to pursue power, and how this 
strategy results in levels of party system fragmentation that are drastically smaller than one 
would expect given its level of ethnic diversity.   
While the efforts of party leaders to make broad ethnic congress-type appeals have 
received a lot of attention from researchers seeking to explain the dominant party systems of 
several African countries, there is reason to believe that the constraining effects of high 
ethnic diversity on party system fragmentation may actually be part of a broader cross-
national phenomenon.  For instance, the experience of countries like India—with its history 
of dominance by the Congress Party, which has appealed to a broad range of ethnic groups in 
order to prevent party fragmentation along ethnic lines—also shows how high levels of ethnic 
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diversity may constrain party system fragmentation, resulting in a nonlinear relationship 
between ethnic diversity and party system fragmentation when observing party systems 
cross-nationally.  Given that elites in other ethnically diverse countries have also mobilized 
support through ethnic congress parties instead of more particularistic ethnic-based parties, 
this suggests that the findings of low levels of party system fragmentation in highly diverse 
countries may not be unique to African party systems.  Moreover, this shows that a 
generalizable explanation is needed to account for the nonlinear relationship that one 
observes between ethnic diversity and party system fragmentation when viewing party 
systems in cross-national perspective.   
3. The Organizational Ecology of Ethnic Cleavages 
In order to provide a generalizable explanation of the relationship between ethnic and 
party system fragmentation that can bridge the gap between the findings from developed 
democracies and those from Africa and elsewhere with more extreme levels of ethnic 
diversity, I argue that the relationship between ethnic diversity and party system 
fragmentation is nonlinear.  In order to explain this nonlinear relationship, I refer to several 
theories of organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Singh and Lumsden, 1990).  
Organizational ecology has been applied to a wide range of organizations, including political 
organizations and institutions, such as interest groups (e.g. Lowery and Gray, 1995; Nownes, 
2004, 2010; Stretesky, Huss, and Lynch, 2012), electoral systems (Lowery et al., 2010), and 
political parties (Lowery et al., 2013).  At present, it remains to be applied to social 
cleavages.   
One notion known as density dependence maintains that the emergence and survival 
of organizations (such as political parties) depends upon the availability of resources capable 
of creating and sustaining such organizations (Delacroix and Carroll, 1983; Hannan and 
Carroll, 1992).  Similar to population ecology in biology, the evolution of organizations is 
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determined by the competition for those scarce resources, which operates in a process of 
natural selection.  The number and viability of organizations will increase as the resources 
capable of sustaining them increase.  However, because these resources are usually finite, 
competition for scarce resources begins to place limits on the entry of new organizations 
without the death (i.e. exit) of an old organization.  When the entry of a new organization 
intensifies competition for resources, this will produce a decline in the number of new 
organizations entering the system, thus leading to a nonlinear relationship between resource 
availability and organizational density.   
There are two reasons to believe that the scarcity of resources may produce not only a 
levelling off in the number of new organizations entering the system, but perhaps even a 
decline in organizational density.  First, the limits of scarce resources particularly affect the 
ability of small organizations to compete and survive.  In conditions of scarce resources, there 
is a liability of smallness (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan, 1983), 
meaning that smaller organizations are less effective than larger organizations, and therefore 
less viable (as larger organizations can better distribute risk than small organizations, which 
are more prone to acute shocks in the availability of resources).  In conditions of extreme 
diversity, small ethnic-based parties representing one ethnic group exclusively are not well-
suited to exert much influence over the formation of government and/or policy relative to 
larger ethnic congress parties, and thus are more likely to exit (or be deserted by voters) in 
conditions of extreme ethnic diversity.   
Second, while specialist organizations like ethnic-based parties are generally best-
suited to compete under most conditions (consistent with the expectation that increases in 
cleavage diversity produce linear increases in party system fragmentation), more generalist 
organizations like ethnic congress parties are better-suited under other conditions.  According 
to fitness set theory (Freeman and Hannan, 1983), generalist organizations are better-suited 
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than specialist organizations in conditions of coarse grain (i.e. where conditions change 
slowly, as in the case of social cleavage structures) and high environmental variability (in this 
case, ethnic diversity).  In cases of high levels of ethnic diversity, fitness set theory predicts 
that more generalist ethnic congress parties are better-suited to compete for voters than more 
specialist ethnic-based parties.   
Applied to ethnic diversity, these organizational ecology theories predict that the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and party system fragmentation is nonlinear, possibly 
non-monotonic.  As ethnic diversity increases, more resources (ethnic groups) capable of 
sustaining ethnic-based parties become available, and party system fragmentation increases 
as a result.  In conditions of resource scarcity (i.e. when ethnic diversity increases beyond 
moderate levels), however, competition for scarce resources increases, and density 
dependence dynamics begin to produce a nonlinear relationship between resource availability 
(i.e. ethnic diversity) and organizational density (i.e. party system fragmentation).  Drawing 
from the example of countries in Africa and elsewhere with high levels of ethnic diversity, 
this creates incentives for larger ethnic congress parties—which more efficiently utilize 
resources (i.e. mobilize voters) and are thus more capable of winning representation—to form 
and ultimately displace the myriad smaller ethnic-based parties catering to specific ethnic 
groups.  In such situations, growth in party system fragmentation will level off and possibly 
even decrease.   
Support for this argument can already be found in previous research.  Consistent with 
the notion that the effect of ethnic diversity on conflict should be nonlinear—producing little 
to no conflict in homogeneous and extremely fragmented systems, but producing significant 
conflict in cases of moderate diversity (Horowitz, 1985)—recent research shows that 
electoral volatility in African polities is greatest is countries with moderate levels of ethnic 
diversity and lowest in countries at the low and high extremes of ethnic diversity (Ferree, 
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2010).  This argument builds on other research focusing on African systems, maintaining that 
party system fragmentation should be highest in countries where ethnic diversity is moderate 
and lowest in countries with either low or high ethnic diversity (Mozaffar, Scarritt, and 
Galaich, 2003: 389).  By referring to theories of organizational ecology, the argument 
presented here extends this logic beyond African polities to party systems cross-nationally, in 
line with other research focusing on the non-monotonicity of social diversity more broadly 
(Stoll, 2013).
2
   
Additionally, the argument presented here is in keeping with a large body of research 
maintaining that party elites play an important role in determining which cleavages will be 
salient to voting behavior (e.g. Enyedi, 2005; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Sartori, 1969; 
Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003).  This can be seen particularly clearly in the context of several 
African countries, where Posner (2004b) has shown that elites in Malawi and Zambia have 
rallied the support of two tribes present in both countries in different ways—appealing to 
ethnic groups using divisive appeals in Malawi but cooperative appeals in Zambia—that are 
in keeping with their respective institutional contexts.  Consistent with this research, the 
argument put forth here maintains that elites choose to rally ethnic groups through ethnic-
based or ethnic congress parties depending on the size of ethnic groups relative to the overall 
ethnic diversity of the country.   
4. Research Design 
To test the argument presented above, I examine the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and party system fragmentation using a well-known data set including elections 
from around the world (Golder, 2005).  The main independent variable is ethnic diversity.  
Recognizing the concerns with the measurement of ethnic cleavages raised by several authors 
(Scarritt and Mozaffar, 1999; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich, 2003; Posner, 2004a), I 
measure ethnic diversity using a variable that is based upon the Constructivist notion of 
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ethnopolitical cleavages, or ethnic identities that are deliberately politicized by political 
leaders.  Specifically, I calculate the effective number of ethnic groups (ENEG)—following 
the practice of Clark and Golder (2006)—using data on ethnic diversity collected by Fearon 
(2003).  This data set includes all ethnic groups that have, historically, been politicized and 
comprising at least one percent of the population.  Using this variable has the advantage of 
focusing solely on those ethnic identities that are relevant to politics and ignoring ethnic 
identities that are not.
3
  In order to capture the nonlinear effects of ethnic cleavages, I include 
both linear and squared terms for ENEG.   
Recognizing that the results may be sensitive to the choice of ethnic cleavage measure 
(Stoll, 2008), I run robustness tests using alternate measures of ethnic diversity.  Using 
alternative measures of ethnic diversity are particularly important in this case given the 
possibility that the number of politically relevant ethnic groups may be endogenous to the 
electoral system in which ethnic groups operate.  While this does not appear to be the case,
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the results should be robust to the use of alternative variables that do not take into account 
whether groups are politically relevant or not in calculating ethnic diversity.  One such 
alternative measure (ELF) is the Atlas Narodov Mira measure of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization reported in Taylor and Hudson (1972).  A second (ENETH) is based on the 
measure of ethnic fractionalization developed by Alesina et al. (2003).  Like with ENEG, 
these variables are transformed into measures of the effective number of ethnic groups.
5
  
Despite theoretical differences in the calculation of these three measures, ENEG is strongly 
correlated with both ELF (R=0.77) and ENETH (R=0.76).   
The dependent variable, party system fragmentation, is measured using the effective 
number of electoral parties (ENEP) developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), which is 
calculated using parties’ legislative vote shares (for the lower house, where applicable).6  
This variable is preferable to the effective number of parliamentary parties, which is 
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calculated using parties’ seat shares instead of vote shares.  Because ENEP is calculated 
using vote shares, it is better able to capture any effects of ethnic cleavages on strategic 
voting (or the lack thereof) that may reduce party system fragmentation.   
Data for this variable is taken from the “Democratic Electoral Systems Around the 
World, 1946-2000” data set collected by Golder (2005, 2007).  This data set includes 867 
legislative elections from every continent covering the period from 1946-2000.  In keeping 
with Clark and Golder (2006, 2007), I drop all elections where the “other” category used to 
calculate ENEP exceeds 15 percent of the vote, as well as all non-competitive elections, all 
elections using a fused vote in presidential/legislative elections, and countries with 
majoritarian upper tier electoral systems.  Because African elections make up the bulk of the 
observations with the highest levels of ethnic diversity, it is important to ensure that the 
African elections included in the Golder (2005) sample used here are representative, or 
whether the results are conditional upon a non-representative sample of African elections.  To 
address this potential shortcoming, I add to the Golder data set several African elections that 
were originally collected by Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich (2003)—and recollected by 
Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2007b)—but not included in Golder (2005) and present both the 
results of models including and excluding these additional data.   
Following the practice of the now-standard interactive model of party system 
fragmentation developed by Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and Clark and Golder (2006), I 
include several additional independent variables.  First, and most importantly, is district 
magnitude (LogM).  Following the standard practice in Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and 
Clark and Golder (2006), I include the logged functional form of district magnitude.  I also 
include interaction terms between district magnitude and each ethnic diversity variable.   
I also include the other control variables from the standard Amorim Neto and Cox 
model, again using data from Golder (2005, 2007).  One variable (Upper Tier) measures the 
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percentage of seats allocated in an upper tier.  Following conventional practice, this variable 
is interacted with ethnic diversity (both the linear and squared terms).  Three other measures 
accounting for the effects of presidential systems are included.  One variable (Proximity) 
measures the degree of concurrence between presidential and parliamentary elections (a 
continuous measure ranging from zero—no presidential elections are held—to one—
presidential and parliamentary elections are held concurrently).  A second measures the 
effective number of presidential candidates (ENPRES).  A third variable is the interaction of 
Proximity and ENPRES.   
Finally, I also control for possible legacy effects resulting from independence 
movements against colonial rule (through which leaders mobilized as large a base of 
supporters as possible in order to present a united front: see Hyden, 2006: 28-32) that would 
lead to smaller party systems in African countries despite high levels of ethnic diversity.  
This, in turn, might account for any negative relationship between ethnic diversity and party 
system fragmentation at higher levels of ethnic diversity.  To this end, I include a variable 
that is coded one for African elections and zero otherwise.   
I estimate a total of four models.  Model 1 presents the results using the full sample of 
elections.  Model 2 is identical to model 1, except that it excludes the African elections 
collected by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2007b) to show that the results are not due to the 
inclusion of these additional cases.  To test the robustness of the findings in models 1 and 2, I 
also estimate models using the alternative measures of ethnic diversity.  Model 3 replicates 
model 1, except that it substitutes ELF for ENEG, while model 4 replaces ENEG with 
ENETH.  Following the practice of Clark and Golder (2006), each model is estimated using 
ordinary least squares linear regression with robust standard errors clustered by country.  As 
the data set includes multiple elections per country, yet ethnic diversity is measured only 
once per country, treating each observation as independent may produce under-estimated 
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standard errors.  Clustering the standard errors by country addresses this problem.
7
   
In order to determine whether the addition of the squared ethnic diversity term 
improves model fit, I present the results of two tests.  The first is a joint significance test, 
which tests whether the inclusion of both the linear and squared terms for the ethnic diversity 
variable are jointly significant.  Because the coefficients for the linear and squared terms 
must be interpreted jointly, interpreting each coefficient separately may yield invalid 
conclusions about the significance of the effect of ethnic diversity on party system 
fragmentation.  A significant test statistic would provide evidence that the effect of ethnic 
diversity is nonlinear.   
Additionally, I also present the results of likelihood ratio tests comparing each model 
to a simpler model to determine whether the inclusion of the squared ethnic diversity term 
(and resulting interactions) significantly improves model fit.  To produce this test statistic, I 
estimate two models—a hypothesized model (which is presented in the results below) and a 
null model (which is not).  For instance, Model 1 (the hypothesized model) replicates the 
model estimated by Clark and Golder (2006), but includes the squared term for ENEG and 
the resulting interactions.  The hypothesized model takes the following form:   
𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑃 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺
2 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀 x 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀 x 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺
2 + 𝛽6𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽7𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 x 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 +
𝛽8𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 x 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺
2 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽11 +
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 x 𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎+∈. 
A null model, which excludes the squared ENEG terms, is also estimated to determine 
whether the addition of the squared term improves model fit.  The null model takes the 
following form: 
𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑃 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀 x 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 +
𝛽8𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 x 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽11𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆 +
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𝛽11𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 x 𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎 + 𝜖. 
Because the null model is nested in the hypothesized model, this test determines the degree to 
which including the squared terms in the hypothesized model improves model fit over the 
null model.  A significant likelihood ratio statistic would indicate that the inclusion of the 
squared terms for ENEG (plus the interactions) significantly improves model fit.  This, in 
turn, would provide justification for favoring the hypothesized model over the null model.   
5. Results 
Figure 1 presents a scatterplot of the relationship between party system fragmentation 
and ethnic diversity with a running mean smoother in order to see the bivariate relationship 
before proceeding to the results of the regression models.  The data show a lack of any clear 
linear association between party system fragmentation and ethnic diversity, resulting in 
what—at least initially—appears to be a relatively flat relationship.  At the highest levels of 
ethnic diversity, the relationship becomes negative.
8
  For a point of reference, South Africa 
appears on the high end of the ethnic diversity scale (with an ENEG value of 8.3).  In keeping 
with the expectations of the organizational ecology approach, party system fragmentation in 
the two South African elections included in the Golder data set (1994 and 1999) are quite 
low, much lower than one would expect if the relationship between ethnic diversity and party 
system fragmentation was truly linear.  While there is some evidence that party system 
fragmentation increases as ethnic diversity increases (at least at low levels of ethnic 
diversity), the fact party system fragmentation begins to decline starting at the middle range 
of ethnic diversity suggests the possibility of a nonlinear relationship (especially once 
controls for the other major determinants of party system fragmentation are added).   
Figure 1 about here 
Such a nonlinear association appears in the regression results, which are presented in 
Table 1.  The coefficient for the linear term for ENEG is positive, while the squared term is 
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negative.  This suggests that the relationship between ethnic diversity and party system 
fragmentation is initially positive before leveling off or even declining at higher levels of 
ethnic diversity.  Moreover, the results provide evidence for the hypothesis that the linear and 
squared terms of ENEG are jointly significant.  Additionally, accounting for nonlinearity in 
the effects of ethnic diversity significantly improves model fit.  This can be seen in the results 
of the likelihood ratio test, which shows that the addition of the squared term significantly 
improves model fit over the null model treating the effects of ethnic diversity as linear.   
These findings are not due to any legacy effects particular to the colonial experiences 
faced by African countries.  The nonlinear relationship appears despite the inclusion of a 
variable to account for possible legacy effects particular to Africa that might account for the 
negative relationship between ethnic diversity and party system fragmentation at higher 
levels of ethnic diversity.  These findings hold even in model 2, which uses the restricted 
sample of countries excluding the additional African countries and elections—many of which 
have high levels of ethnic diversity.  As with model 1, the joint significance test statistic 
demonstrates that the linear and squared terms for ENEG are jointly significant.  Also in 
keeping with model 1, the inclusion of the squared term significantly improves model fit, as 
demonstrated by the significant test statistic for the likelihood ratio test.  Thus, these results 
suggest that the relationship between ethnic diversity and party system fragmentation is 
nonlinear.   
Table 1 about here 
The predicted relationship between ethnic diversity and party system fragmentation 
can be seen more clearly in graphical form.  Figure 2 graphically demonstrates the 
nonlinearity of the predicted relationship between ethnic diversity and party system 
fragmentation.  Specifically, Figure 2 presents the predicted values of ENEP using the results 
from model 1 across the range of ethnic diversity, holding all control variables constant 
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(which assumes a district magnitude of one).  As seen in Figure 2, increases in ethnic 
diversity lead to values of ENEP characteristic of multiparty systems until reaching moderate 
levels of ethnic diversity.  Consistent with fitness set theory (as well as the liability of 
smallness), however, the relationship between ethnic diversity and ENEP gradually becomes 
negative at the highest levels of diversity.   
Figure 2 about here 
These findings are reinforced by the fact that the relationship between ethnic diversity 
and party system fragmentation remains nonlinear when using alternative measures of ethnic 
diversity.  This can be seen in models 3 and 4, which use ELF and ENETH as measures of 
ethnic diversity, respectively.  Consistent with the findings in models 2 and 3, the results in 
models 3 and 4 demonstrate further that the relationship between ethnic diversity and party 
system fragmentation is nonlinear.  While the coefficients for the squared terms for both ELF 
and ENETH do not reach statistical significance, the result of the joint significance tests—
which do reach conventional levels of significance—suggest that the relationships between 
party system fragmentation and both ELF and ENETH are nonlinear.  Additionally, the 
likelihood ratio test statistics in both models also reach statistical significance.  This suggests 
that the inclusion of a squared term for each model’s respective ethnicity variables 
significantly improves model fit over the null models that do not include the squared terms.  
In this sense, there is statistical evidence that the relationships between ELF/ENETH and 
party system fragmentation are nonlinear.   
The precise shapes of these relationships can be seen in Figures 3 and 4.  Figure 3 
presents the predicted relationship between ELF and party system fragmentation using the 
results from model 3, holding all other variables constant.  As in Figure 2, party system 
fragmentation increases as ELF increases from low to medium values before leveling off at 
higher values, consistent with the notion of density dependence (though not consistent with 
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fitness set theory).  Although the uncertainty of these estimates increases dramatically at the 
highest levels of ELF, the nonlinearity in the effect of ELF on party system fragmentation is 
observed across nearly the entire range of ELF.  Despite the absence of the drop-off in 
predicted party system fragmentation at the highest levels of ethnic diversity seen in Figure 2, 
the fact remains that the relationship between ethnic diversity and party system fragmentation 
in Figure 3 is nonlinear, and both sets of predicted values are in keeping with an 
organizational ecology interpretation of ethnic diversity effects.   
Figure 3 about here 
Like with Figures 2 and 3, the relationship between ENETH and party system 
fragmentation is nonlinear.  This can be seen more clearly in Figure 4, which presents the 
predicted values of party system fragmentation using the results from model 4 across the 
range of ENETH, again assuming district magnitude equals one.  As in Figure 2, party system 
fragmentation increases as ethnic diversity approaches the middle range of diversification, at 
which party system fragmentation begins to decline—consistent with fitness set theory and 
the liability of smallness.  Although the curve in the predicted values seen in Figure 4 is not 
nearly as steep across the middle range of ENETH as that observed in Figure 2, and although 
there is greater uncertainty to these predicted values, the observed relationship is generally 
consistent with that observed in Figure 2.  The fact that the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and party system fragmentation in each model is consistent with an organizational 
ecology interpretation demonstrates the robustness of the findings.   
Figure 4 about here 
6. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the relationship between 
ethnic diversity and party system fragmentation is nonlinear.  Referring to several 
organizational ecology theories, increases in ethnic diversity facilitate party system 
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fragmentation.  However, at extreme levels of ethnic diversity, competition for scarce 
resources (voters) limits the ability of new parties to form without the exit of existing parties.  
At the most extreme levels, there is evidence that increased competition leads to a decrease in 
party system fragmentation, with ethnic congress parties that represent several ethnic groups 
replacing less competitive ethnic-based parties that represent a single ethnic group.  Applied 
to a broad cross-national sample by building on the now-standard model developed by 
Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and Clark and Golder (2006), the results provide considerable 
support for this hypothesis.   
In developing the argument that the effect of ethnic diversity on party system 
fragmentation is nonlinear, this paper combines insights from research focusing on African 
party systems with the established literature on the interaction between electoral systems and 
social cleavages.  In doing so, this paper goes some way toward resolving the debate between 
those maintaining that African party systems are fundamentally different (e.g. Mozaffar, 
Scarritt, and Galaich, 2003) and those who maintain that African party systems conform to 
the findings of previous research (e.g. Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2007a).  According to the 
argument and findings presented here, African party systems (and other countries with high 
levels of ethnic diversity) are not fundamentally different from party systems elsewhere.  
Instead, the relationship between ethnicity and party system fragmentation is nonlinear 
because the extreme diversity seen in many African countries is not able to sustain smaller 
ethnic-based parties, which results in less party system fragmentation.   
The findings presented here may present an important revision to a considerable body 
of research (e.g. Duverger, 1954; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox, 
1997; Clark and Golder, 2006; Singer and Stephenson, 2009), which has assumed 
(intentionally or not) that the effects of cleavages are linear.  Because the results presented 
here suggest that the relationship between ethnic diversity and party system fragmentation is 
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nonlinear, and because most of the studies examining the interaction of cleavages and 
electoral system proportionality have used measures of ethnic diversity to measure the effects 
of social cleavages, future studies must re-evaluate the conclusions reached by earlier 
research.  By failing to account for the nonlinearity of ethnic (and potentially other) 
cleavages, it is quite possible that cleavage effects have been underestimated in previous 
research, and the effects of electoral systems in constraining the impact of cleavages have 
been overstated, at least to some extent.  The fact that party system fragmentation in many 
plurality systems significantly exceeds the two-party predictions made by Duverger (1954), 
illustrate the importance of this point.  In light of the findings presented here, many of the 
conclusions reached by this literature need to be revisited in order to determine whether this 
is the case.   
Finally, the logic behind these findings may be applicable to other measures of 
cleavage diversity.  Like with ethnic diversity, religious diversity may produce incentives for 
religious group leaders to coalesce behind one party banner in religiously diverse countries in 
the same way that ethnic groups coalesce behind ethnic congress parties in extremely 
ethnically diverse countries.  One need only look to the United States for an example of this, 
where high religious diversity has produced a coalition of religiously observant voters—
eroding the longstanding differences between Protestants and Catholics—under the banner of 
the Republican Party (e.g. Layman, 2001).  This suggests that the effects of other cleavages 
on party system fragmentation may be nonlinear as well.  Future research, therefore, is 
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Joint Significance 6.24** 4.00* 7.23** 3.38* 
LR Test 24.01** 47.65** 9.10* 16.85** 
R
2
  0.34 0.36 0.34 0.38 
n  589 555 609 692 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, one-tailed tests.  Entries represent regression coefficients with robust standard errors 
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2.  “Joint Significance” refers to the results of an F test that the linear and squared 
terms for the respective ethnic diversity variable included in each model are jointly significant.  “LR Test” refers 
to the results of a likelihood ratio test comparing the model including ENEG and ENEG
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This supplementary file presents the results of robustness tests re-estimating all four 
models presented in Table 1 in the main text.  As noted in footnote 8 in the main text, these 
robustness tests serve to assuage concerns that the results for the ethnic diversity variables 
presented are due to the presence of outlier effects.  As seen in Figure 1 in the main text, with 
only a handful of countries at the highest levels of each ethnic diversity variable, one has to 
wonder if the findings of nonlinear association between ethnic diversity and party system 
fragmentation are due to the presence of these outlying values of ethnic diversity.   
To provide such assurances, I re-estimated each model presented in Table 1 in the 
main text replacing the linear and squared measures of ethnic diversity with a single variable 
measuring ethnic diversity that uses the (natural) logged functional form.  The argument 
presented in the main text holds that ethnic diversity should be positively associated with 
party system fragmentation in roughly linear fashion at lower levels of ethnic diversity; 
however, this effect should begin to level off—possibly reaching a plateau—at the highest 
levels of ethnic diversity.  In keeping with the organizational ecology approach (particularly 
the notion of density dependence), the data transformation produced when using the logged 
functional form assumes a sigmoid-shaped relationship between ethnic diversity and party 
system fragmentation.  Because this sigmoid-shaped relationship is in keeping with 
organizational ecology theories (see Lowery et al., 2010), positive and significant coefficients 
for each logged ethnic diversity variable would provide evidence supporting the 
organizational ecology argument presented in the main text.   
The results of the robustness tests—re-estimating each model in Table 1 using the 
logged functional form—appear in Table S.1, which replicates Table 1 in the main text with 
the exception that the linear and squared measures of ethnic diversity have been replaced with 
their logged functional forms.  As the results show, ethnic diversity is positively and 
30 
 
significantly associated with party system fragmentation in all four models.  These results 
confirm the findings presented in the main text.   
Examining the predicted values of party system fragmentation graphically illustrates 
this point even further.  Figures S.1-S.3 present the predicted values of party system 
fragmentation using the results from models 1, 3, and 4 in Table S.1.  To facilitate 
comparison with Figures 2-4 in the main text, and to observe the nonlinearity in the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and party system fragmentation implied by the use of 
the logged functional form, the values in Figures S.1-S.3 have been back-transformed (i.e. I 
take the exponential values of ethnic diversity in order to return ethnic diversity to its original 
scale).  Consistent with the expectations of the organizational ecology approach (especially 
the notion of density dependence), party system fragmentation increases as ethnic diversity 
increases at lower levels of party system fragmentation when using all three measures of 
ethnic diversity.  However, this increase begins to level off quickly beginning at medium 
values of ethnic diversity, and flattens out nearly entirely at the highest levels of ethnic 
diversity.   
In sum, these results confirm the findings presented in the main text.  Both here and in 
the main text, the results show that the relationship between ethnic diversity and party system 
fragmentation is nonlinear.  While there is some evidence from the results presented in the 
main text that party system fragmentation may drop off at the highest levels of ethnic 
diversity, as is the case in Figures 2 and 4 (findings that are not supported in this 
Supplementary File), the differences between Figures 2 and 4 versus Figures S.1-S.3 may be 
due simply to the small number of observations at the highest levels of ethnic diversity.  The 
bigger point is that both sets of findings—whether party system fragmentation levels off or 
declines at the highest levels of ethnic diversity—show that the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and party system fragmentation is nonlinear.  More importantly, both sets of 
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findings are consistent with the organizational ecology theories discussed in the main text.  
Thus, there is strong, robust evidence that the relationship between ethnic diversity and party 
system fragmentation is nonlinear and that this nonlinear relationship can be explained by an 




Table S.1: The Nonlinear Effects of Ethnic Diversity on Party System Fragmentation (ENEP) Using 
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(0.25) 
 
ln(ENETH)    0.62* 
(0.31) 















































































  0.33 0.31 0.33 0.37 
n  589 555 609 692 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, one-tailed tests.  Entries represent regression coefficients with robust standard errors 
clustered by country in parentheses.  The results for a control variable for a significant outlier—Comoros—are 










Note: dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.  ENEG has been back-transformed in order to show the 











































Note: dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.  ELF has been back-transformed in order to show the 
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1
 Because of the difficulty in defining the concept of ethnic parties (see Chandra, 2011), I use 
the term “ethnic-based party” to refer to a party that appeals to (and wins support from) one 
ethnic group exclusively (or nearly so) and the term “ethnic congress party” to refer to parties 
that mobilize voters and win support from multiple ethnic groups. 
2
 While Stoll (2013) finds that the effects of social diversity on party system fragmentation 
vary considerably across the range of social diversity, the present study is focused on one 
particular cleavage.  As such, the predictions made here with regard to the non-monotonic 
effects of social diversity may be particular to ethnic diversity.   
3
 Although it would have been desirable to include another variable measuring the degree to 
which each ethnic group is concentrated in certain regions—in keeping with Mozaffar, 
Scarritt, and Galaich (2003)—such data are not available.  As noted by Fearon (2003: 196), 
while the Minorities at Risk (Birnir et al., 2012) data set includes data on the degree of 
concentration for each ethnic group, the definition and coverage of ethnic groups focuses 
only on ethnic groups “at risk” and/or facing discrimination (or engaging in discrimination), 
and thus truncates the sample of ethnic diversity.   
4
 While ethnic diversity provides incentives for the formation of multiple parties, these parties 
would only receive seats in PR systems, and thus elites in majoritarian systems have fewer 
incentives to try to activate multiple ethnic identities.  If ethnic identification—and, in turn, 
levels of ethnic diversity—was determined primarily by the electoral system, then we would 
expect more ethnic diversity in PR systems than majoritarian systems.  In fact, ethnic 
diversity is significantly greater in majoritarian systems than in PR systems (as determined 
by t-tests).   
5
 This is done using the following formulas: 1/(1-FELF) and 1/(1-FAlesina et al.), where FELF is the 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization measure reported by Taylor and Hudson (2003) and FAlesina et 
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al. is the ethnic fractionalization measure developed by Alesina et al. (2003).   
6
 Taagepera (1997) notes potential problems of inference arising from the calculation of 
ENEP with an “other parties” category (and offers a correction for this problem).  Following 
the practice of Clark and Golder (2006), I also apply this correction.   
7
 In order to address possible contemporaneous correlation in the standard errors, I also 
estimated models using panel-corrected standard errors (see Beck and Katz, 1995) by treating 
election years as the units of analysis so that elections are spaced at regular intervals (instead 
of irregularly spaced intervals when using country years as the units of analysis).  The results 
using this approach are even more statistically significant than the findings presented here.   
8
 Recognizing the outlier potential caused by countries with outlying values of ethnic 
diversity, I re-estimated each model presented in Table 1 using (natural) log-transformed 
values of ethnic diversity instead of the quadratic functional form used here.  The results 
using these alternative measures can be seen in the Supplementary File.  Because the logged 
functional form implies the very sigmoid-shaped curve expected by organizational ecology 
theories (on this point, see also Lowery et al., 2010), the results of these robustness tests only 
serve to reinforce the substantive conclusions drawn here.   
